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Professor Macedo amply demonstrates' that he has carefully read
and thought about my essay. Given his generally complimentary re-
marks, it would be churlish to take significant issue with them. More to
the point, I do not have the time to engage in an equally careful analysis
of his argument. These brief paragraphs, therefore, should in no way be
taken as a "response." I do think it worth saying, though, that the differ-
ences between us may be of less operative import than may otherwise
appear to be the case.
I accept Macedo's point that one cannot play the game of "thinking
like a lawyer"-by, for example, offering an interpretation of the ninth
amendment-and remain a full-scale skeptic (whatever that might
mean). That is, to adopt the role of lawyer, law professor, judge, onlook-
ing citizen, or whatever requires that one accept one's presence "within"
the existing grammar of legal argumentation. Moreover, analysts indeed
present what appear to them the "best" arguments available within that
grammar. It is also clearly the case that what one thinks "best" will
inevitably depend on the normative views, implicit or explicit, that one
has.
However, we might indeed disagree on the importance placed on the
"foundation" offered for one's normative views or the particularities of
"internal" legal interpretation. As a "skeptic," I doubt that we can
achieve any kind of firm foundation; more importantly, I doubt that this
inability matters very much. After all, life goes on, pragmatically. Pro-
fessor Macedo may believe both that foundations are attainable and that
it matters whether one accepts these foundations. In any case, it is
wholly unclear that our "meta"-differences have much to do with our
interpretations of the ninth amendment. One does not discover the an-
swer to concrete cases by learning that I am a "skeptic" or that Professor
Macedo believes in natural law.
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